

UNIBAT STM

Tabletop Exercise (TTX)

Purpose: This exercise is a capstone learning activity to consolidate and encapsulate the major lesson outcomes and take-aways from the Specialised Training Materials (STM)

Target audience: Leadership, planning staff, and key personnel of the deploying UNIBAT.

TTX: TTXs are set in an informal setting where the target audience can discuss the principles, concepts, and tactical planning considerations for operating in a UN Peacekeeping operation using a hypothetical scenario. Using your own MDMP, the TTX is based on a more rapid / modified Course of Action (COA) development process using your own criteria for vetting COAs. This exercise is used to help reinforce the learning objectives. More importantly, it helps participants to better understand the manifestation of integrating units in a peacekeeping environment. Also, it can reinforce and, in some cases, adjust a TCC's planning process, helping planners consider certain PKO policy, environmental, and organisational factors when framing their pre-deployment training, logistics systems, resources, and command and control. The effectiveness of a TTX is derived from the energetic involvement of participants and their assessment of recommended revisions to the COAs that may affect current policies, procedures, and plans to be able to operate effectively / efficiently in a UN peacekeeping environment. It is essential that a skilled instructor is selected to oversee the exercise who is familiar with the facilitation process of encouraging student discussion and a free exchange of ideas.

Methodology: Using the tactical planning considerations that were presented in the Module 3 lessons, participants are given a condensed version of the scenario, maps, supporting documents, 2 to 3 situations, and events that support a story line. They are encouraged to develop and discuss issues in a phased paced (hasty) problem-solving process (rather than a detailed refined order development). Using their own national military decision-making process, problem-solving doctrine, troop-leading procedure (TLP), they analyse the situation, tasks, events, staff products and develop COAs to be considered.

The TTX emphasises / reinforces operations in the PKO environment characterized by chaos and confusion, incomplete situational awareness, a civilianized logistical system, an over-stretched AOR requiring commanders to prioritize threats and risks, complex C2 arrangements, and slow response and decision making from higher HQs.

Time required: This TTX could be completed within 2 days (1.5 day if condensed).

Instructor Notes

Best practices for TTX instructors:

- Do not act as a lecturer, but as a guide to oversee knowledge sharing
- Record all ideas and key points without judgment
- Try to generate solutions from the participants
- Encourage contributions by all members (not just senior officers)
- Identify ideas that can be combined
- Review, vet, and prioritise ideas with participants
- As an experienced peacekeeper, help bring out or share knowledge and lessons learned without driving a particular solution
- Conduct an orientation upfront with the participants that covers overall aim, objectives, outcomes, requirements, methodology, constraints, timeline, rules, and recorder's responsibilities

Learning Activity 1 – Orientation / Mission Analysis

- Explain the purpose, method, and process of the TTX (10 minutes)
- Brief or provide the “General Situation” (30 minutes)
- Divide up into groups, no more than 6 per group
- Provide the “General Situation,” TTX map products, and ITSUM to the groups, and instruct them to conduct a risk analysis of high-level threats against the civilian population and to UN forces (which are not the same). These products will drive the analysis to identify the higher risks analysis (3-4 hours)
- Remind the group of the risk analysis matrices from STM module 3.1 and 3.2.
- Groups return to plenary brief the threat / risk analysis using the risk matrix. Moderate the discussion. As a plenary, they should agree on the high-risk threats to POC and others associated with FP for all groups to use going forward.

Learning Activity 2 – COA Development

- Brief the updated information and explain the task
- Allow 3 hours for COA development in break-out groups; each group 1 COA
- Return to plenary and allow groups to present COAs (15-20 min each group)
- Discuss what your criteria might be in selecting a COA (30 minutes)
- Analyse COAs according to criteria. If time is short, you may shorten this by allowing the commander to direct a COA.
- Summarise lessons learned (go over key points using criteria) (20 minutes)

Instructor Notes

Learning Activity 3

- Brief the updated information and explain the task (10 minutes)
- Break into groups and allow them to develop COAs (2 hours)
- Return to plenary and allow groups to present COAs (15-20 min each group)
- Select a COA (the instructor can certainly lead the UNIBAT through a full COA comparison/selection procedure, but for the sake of time, it may be useful to push the participants to the next activity).
- Summarise lessons learned (go over key points using criteria) (20 minutes)

Learning Activity #4

- Brief the updated information and explain the task (10 minutes)
- Break into groups and allow them to develop COAs (2 hours)
- Return to plenary and allow groups to present COAs (15-20 min each group)
- Select a COA.
- Summarise lessons learned (go over key points using criteria) (20 minutes)

AAR

- Conduct an After-Action Review and conclusion of lessons learned and reinforced
- Provide feedback to the unit and your peacekeeping stakeholder community

General Situation

The current crisis in the country of Mokavania is essentially that a government cannot provide security amongst its multiethnic population, especially between the Cambo people and the Payat.

Mokavania is an island country off the coast of Africa, and the ethnic strife has its origins in pre-colonial times. In the 1800s the Payat tribe was forced to flee from its ancestral lands by the more powerful Cambo. The Payat retained possession of the land now called Greater Pyatiletka, while the Cambo settled east of the Payat River, in what is now the province of Cambonia. The Payat have never abandoned their claims to their old lands in current Cambonia, and some Payat continue to live in isolated pockets in Cambo lands.

During the 1960s, the Cambo launched an unprovoked attack on Greater Pyatiletka, which the Payat successfully halted. The areas held by the belligerent parties at the end of those hostilities established the current provincial boundaries. Those boundaries have never been accepted by belligerents, despite efforts by the Mokavianian Government to mediate. Since then, repeated minor skirmishes have taken place between the two groups, with both sides forming militias that have caches of weapons and landmines at their disposal. The government of Mokavania, weak and struggling from corruption and insufficient tax revenue, could not disband the militia groups for fear of destabilising the entire country. Instead, it chose to sanction the militias, with the long-term goal to integrate them into the Mokavianian Armed Forces.

In recent times, the two militias [the Cambo Independent Security Council (CISC) and the Payat Resistance Movement (PRM)] have launched several attacks on each other's provinces. Despite heavy fighting which has resulted in a large number of casualties, especially among the civilian population, neither of the belligerents has been able to achieve its military objectives. The Mokavianian Government was unable to provide safety and security to civilians in the area, but it was able to negotiate a ceasefire (Treaty of Entebbe), and both parties agreed to international mediation and intervention.

The UN has responded by deploying primarily an observer mission, with a small military security force, EOD detachment, DDR element, and police force via a UN mandate, the United Nations Mission in Mokavania (UNMIM), to monitor the belligerent parties and assist the Mokavianian Government in the protection of civilians. UNMIM has now been deployed for 8 months.

Population of Mokavania

The population of Mokavania includes many different tribes and people groups. However, in our battalion sector, there are two primary groups: The Cambo and the Payat. Both the Cambo and the Payat are minority groups inside Mokavania, and both have individually had peaceable relations with the government and the ethnic Mokavian majority. However, deep-seeded enmity exists between the Cambo and the Payat, and they rarely live alongside one another except in urban centers, such as Pyatiletka. Even then, they live segregated in different urban boroughs.

Both Payat and Cambo live at lower income levels than the Mokavian majority. The Cambo have benefited from a relatively greater degree of economic interaction with greater Mokavania, but the Payat are more numerous. They often live in villages rather than in larger urban areas, except in Pyatiletka, an ancient Payat city. The Cambo are more represented in the Mokavian armed forces, which is a source of frustration for the Payat.

The two groups have religious differences which have added to their enmity, although it is not the primary source of their hatred. The Payat are Catholic – a product of the first wave of European colonisation. The Cambo are Protestant largely because of the second colony wave – a fact which gave them proportionally greater power over the Payat during that colonial period.

Host Nation Forces

The Mokavian Army has focused its forces on securing the capital farther to the East. In our Battalion AOR, there are two battalions and one separate company of the Mokavian Armed Forces (MAF). Each of the battalions has roughly 500 troops organised into 4 companies. They are equipped with light weapons and utilize Toyota pickup trucks as transport. They rarely have enough fuel or operational vehicles to move the entire battalion, so they rely on temporary checkpoints and dismounted patrols. The 1st Battalion's base is in a small village 5km east of our Temporary Operating Base - Alpha. The 2nd Battalion's base is in Mezhduruchenskoye, a small village that UN forces refer to as "Two Rivers." This is approximately 5km west of TOB-Bravo, where our Battalion HQ is located, along with Bravo Company and our reserve.

The MAF also has a separate company providing security at the Shemalgan IDP camp, outside of the village of Shemalgan and near our TOB-Charlie.

The Mokavian National Police (MNP) focus resources on the cities (especially in Pyatiletka), so small police stations in the villages have very limited capability. The MNP does conduct patrols in our AOR, but they are largely overwhelmed by petty crimes and do not try to confront the Payat or Cambo militias. There is a MNP company in Pyatiletka that is trained in crowd control.

Both the police and army have suffered from lack of financial support from the Mokavianian government, which has led to their forces lacking initiative and motivation. Some units have not received pay in months, and enterprising police officers have started to collect illegal taxes to supplement their incomes.

The UN mission analysis cell has given negative reports about dropping popular support for the Mokavianian police and armed forces, particularly with the Payat, who are under-represented in the MAF and MNP.

Armed Groups

There are three armed groups in our AOR.

1. The Payat Resistance Movement (PRM) is assessed to have between **50-70** fighters, although there are signs that more and more disaffected Payat may join the movement despite the tribal leaders' agreement to the cease-fire and its associated disarmament protocol. The PRM believe that the tribal leaders mistakenly agreed to the protocol, and that they should preserve weapons to use to re-take their lands from the Cambo if the Cambo violate the agreement or attack their people again. In the fighting before the cease-fire, the PRM demonstrated the ability to make complex, remote-detonated IEDs from old anti-tank mines. The PRM are concerned that the Cambo may exploit their greater numbers in the Mokavianian Army and seize control of key resources or power. Thus, the PRM are somewhat skeptical of government security forces. The PRM are organised into 3 detachments with a rigid command structure and strict secrecy.
2. Like the PRM, the Cambo Independence Security Council (CISC) is a group of fighters that believes the peace agreement will ultimately fail, and that they must be ready to fight the Payat once again. It is thought to consist of two Operational Teams (OT) of 10 men and women. Each OT has the capacity to make and use IEDs and is lightly armed and use highjacked civilian vehicles. They mainly operate at night. It is probable that the Operational Teams will seek to undermine the armed forces' and police' ability to provide security. They intend to conduct a mass impact attack in ethnic Payat enclaves using IEDs. Although the CISC in SE of the country have a history of child abductions, it is not assessed that this cell has the capability or intent in our Battalion AOR.
3. The Shining Path (SP) is a small sect of an ancient pagan religion that espouses the belief in societal rebirth through suffering. Far from the roots of their religion (which advocated embracing personal adversity to achieve enlightened perspective and wisdom), the Shining Path advocates exporting personal suffering on others as a means to renew society. For years the group had milder objectives, but government and tribes rejected its teachings, and it was cast out

of urban centers. In the breakdown of the Mokavianian state and the ensuing violence between the Cambo and Payat peoples, however, the Shining Path has sought to acquire UXO, explosive components, mortar shells, and MPADS, but there is no confirmed report that they have been successful. SP is rumored to desire to achieve a major attack that inflicts suffering. The SP is a mystic group that has a cult-like character. It is highly transient, but reports indicate that it is active to our Battalion's north.

4. Armed criminal groups have taken advantage of the current security situation to increase activity in the area. In our AOR, one group is highly organized and has a stranglehold on the extraction of copper from unregistered, illegal mines. The group is believed to be operating on both sides of the international border, but mining activity is reported to be prevalent in our Battalion AOR. Additionally, local leaders are reporting missing children, especially from the IDP camp, while other reports indicate that young boys are being used as both guards and slave labor in the mines.

Humanitarian Presence

Medicins Sans Frontieres (MSF) are present in our Battalion AOR, operating at a medical clinic in Noviy (TOB-Alpha zone) and in the hospital in Shemalgan (TOB-Charlie). MSF at the Shemalgan hospital also provide medical assistance to the Shemalgan IDP camp.

The World Food Program and UNHCR are also active at the Shemalgan IDP camp.

The Shemalgan IDP camp hosts at least 300 IDPs – with more coming each week. They are displaced personnel from the conflict region. The population is a mix of Payat and Cambo, and they are mostly women, children, and older men.

Intelligence Update

- You are the commander and staff of UNIBAT-1. You receive the following Intelligence Summary from your higher HQ.

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UNITED NATIONS

NATIONS UNIES

UNMIM

UNMIM

United Nations Mission in MOLVANIA

Mission des Nations Unies en MOLVANIE

SECTOR HQs G2 Monthly ITSUM for UNIBAT 1 AOR

DATE TIME: xx XXX 20xx

FROM: G2

TO: SECTOR HQS STAFF / SUB-UNITS

The UNCT Mokavania has reported increased attacks on humanitarian food and medical aid supply convoys.

There has been an increased activity of armed groups attacking WFP and NGO aid convoys in the vicinity of the Two River's bridge (5KM North and South of the Bridge) along MSR Gold that runs between the cities of Noviy and Shemalgan. It is assessed that CISC armed groups are targeting UN aid convoys to disrupt the flow of humanitarian aid to the areas dominated by the Payat and to the isolate Payat population enclave south of Karaoy / north of Burundai. Also, in the past week the CISC have become more emboldened by attacking UN military convoys and UNIBAT patrols. Two IEDs have been located on the same MSR in vicinity of the Two River's Bridge (unknown who emplaced them).

UNMO reporting buildup of CISC armed group, agitating population about Payat in Cambo lands.

UNMO reporting indicates an armed group of CISC extremists is consolidating in the city of Noviy. Some 30 individuals with small arms are agitating amongst the Cambo population, saying that Payat in the town north of Burundai have expanded Payat settlements and are

encroaching upon Cambo-held land. They say that Payat also continue to consume resources meant for the Cambo. This CISC group is conducting recruiting activities, with some calling for harassing the Payat in order to displace them. Some are advocating for violence.

Organized PRM demonstrations at an IDP camp near the town of Shemalgan

Demonstrations in Shemalgan IDP camp have become more violent and have left more than 15 IDPs injured and a WFP warehouse raided. The Camp has 300+ displaced women, children, and older men, who lost their sons and husbands in the fighting during the civil war. Both Cambo and Payat ethnicity share the camp. OCHA led an inter-agency assessment of humanitarian needs in the camp and surrounding area and noted that there are increased shortages of food. Additionally, aid has not reached the southern area in vicinity of Burundai, Pyatiletka, and Shemalgan cities. These shortages are causing increased tensions among the local Payat population. Reports indicate that the local populations are complaining that IDPs and refugee camps were receiving all the food and medical aid before any of the local distribution sites. Additionally, there are unfounded rumors that Cambo IDPs in the camp have priority receiving the aid. Some of the local leadership continue to spread this unfounded rumor causing the demonstrations to increase in size.

Illegal Child Labor Camp

An unknown source, who has been highly reliable in the past, has reported the following to a UN patrol: 'that West of Karaoy, across the Mezhduruchenskoye river there is a large mining activity that has 50 young boys under 12 years old being forced to be mine laborers. The laborers are guarded at gunpoint by a mix of armed children and adults (number unknown). Also confirmed by other sources is that there are illegal criminal mining activities in the area.

Very Low Probability: Shining Light may have MPADS

The Shining Light terror organisation has attempting to obtain a ground to air man-portable air-defense systems (MANPADS or MPADS). This weapon is a threat to low-flying aircraft, especially helicopters. The organisation has a goal to humiliate the UN and the newly formed government. Such an attack may convince some members of the UN Security Council to vote against the renewal of the mandate. There are unconfirmed (low in confidence) unsourced reports that the Shining Light may have obtained an old MPAD (operational status unknown). Because the organisation is small, has very limited military capability, no formal training and does not have the support in the local population, the probability of an attack is low.

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CHIEF G9

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TTX Learning Activity #1

- The Sector commander has asked your UNIBAT to provide a threat-based assessment of the vulnerable populations in your AOR.
- Using this general overview, the ITSUM, the provided TTX maps, and the STM lessons and tools, develop a risk analysis to brief to the Sector commander. Use POC planning considerations and Module 3.3 as a guide.

Instructor Notes

- Remind participants of the approach to risk mitigation and that planning focuses on prevention and pre-emption.
- The UNIBAT should identify those threats targeting UN Forces and civilian populations that fall into the risk criteria of likely, highly likely, or imminently to happen and pose a severe or catastrophic impact.
- Point the participants to the tools and procedures in Modules 3.1 – 3.4.

Analyze the threats:

- Who is being targeted and/or harmed?
- Who is the most vulnerable group?
- Who are the actors harming civilians?
- Who is the actor posing the greatest threat to civilians?
- What is the likelihood of each threat?
- Is their harm to civilians intentional or unintentional?
- If harm is intentional, what is their rationale to target civilians? What strategy and tactics do these perpetrators of violence use against civilians?
- What capabilities do they require to target civilians?

Analyze the most likely targeted civilian populations:

- How imminent is the threat to civilians?
- Where is the threat to civilians most imminent?
- Who are the civilians, where are they, and where are they moving?
- What are the population's basic needs?
- How do men, women, girls and boys define their needs differently?
- What needs are not being met?
- Who can meet these needs?
- Who is providing these needs?
- What are the threats to the provision of these needs?
- What are the security implications if these needs are not met?

Keep in mind the difference between likelihood and impact, and how a risk assessment takes into account the relationship between the two.

TTX Learning Activity #2

- A new report comes in via the Force HQ:

“Multiple reliable sources indicate that an armed group of CISC extremists is marshalling in the city of Noviy. There are also corroborated reports from other sources that the group has vehicles and have 40-45 individuals with small arms and that they plan to move south along the MSR going through the city of Karaoy to the Payat enclave near Burundai. The purpose of the group is to harass and intimidate the local Payat population. Another report suggests that the group wants to pilfer humanitarian food supplies in the same area. MKPI assesses that this threat is imminent and that CISC will move within 24 hours.

Sector Commander directs UNIBAT-1 to develop courses of action to address this threat.”

- As you finish reading this report, your Charlie Company (vicinity of Shemalghan) reports that looting and riots have broken out at the Shemalghan IDP camp. The Mokavianian national police (MNP) and army units, who have retreated from the camp, report that there have been fewer deliveries of humanitarian aid in the last week, and the IDPs have blamed both the government for suspected pilfering, as well as the other people group for suspicion of hoarding and preferential treatment. The MNP asked your Charlie Company for assistance, and the C Coy Commander is seeking guidance from the UNIBAT.
- You consider your risk assessment, the directed task from Sector HQ, and the developing situation in Shemalghan IDP camp.
- The Sector Commander, being apprised of the developing situation, directs you to develop COAs to address both threats. The commander directs you to reduce or eliminate your identified risks, and particularly to reduce potential harm to civilians. He/she wants you to consider development of safe corridors, protected areas, secure humanitarian access, etc. The Commander further suggests that you think about:
 - Plans to reduce the likelihood of physical violence
 - Plans to use resources in the most effective way and in support of synchronisation with mission components
 - Coordination with protection actors outside the mission (e.g., humanitarian actors, state authorities)
 - Consultations with communities at risk are critical to ensure the CoA is comprehensive and represents a thorough analysis of all relevant aspects, including their own protection capabilities.

Instructor Notes

- The following are just some of the issues to consider as they develop COAs:
 - Threat based approach, assessing locations that pose the greatest risks
 - Threat/Actors, weapons ranges, dispositions, capabilities, and intent
 - Access routes, ambush sites, vulnerable points, and choke points (Known Areas of Interests- NAI)
 - Reconnaissance: How to identify early warning indicators and information requirements
 - Detect. To identify and/or locate MPC fighters along routes
 - Find Bypasses. Plan / Locate / maneuver routes around obstacles, position, or threats
 - Tasks organisation: EP team, civil military affairs team, engineer section, riot gear, detainee package
 - Coordinating with- Regional CT, WFP Representative, Commander on ground, Village leadership, host nation security leadership
 - Dominate the area to deter additional violence, Isolate the area through patrols and check points
 - Look at all the tasks that support security in the AOR, not just one
 - Recommend mitigating measures to avoid issues / incidents during execution and to reduce risks
 - Determine the right size / capable force to escort and other forces to man CPs and patrol NAIs to prevent and or pre-empt attacks
 - Plan patrols with a task and purpose, occupy NAIs, and organise the escort to include Reconnaissance Advance guard, Close protection group. Rear guard
 - Who else can help avoid incident in the mission, in the country, other stakeholders, host nation security forces etc.
 - Timelines and duration; QRF does the task and consolidates; reserve force can be mobilised and give the AOR for longer period or until the area is safe and secure

TTX Learning Activity #3

- You have successfully prevented a serious escalation in ethnic conflict in your AOR, and the security situation has returned to a more manageable, less acute state, but you receive an updated report from Sector HQs:

“MPKI reports a significant expansion of illegal mining activities and associated child labor and recruiting of child soldiers. As a result, the UNSC has expanded our mandate, giving authority to the UN military to assist local authorities with operations to report and detain criminals operating illegal mines. Force HQ has directed an AOR-wide investigation of these activities and to assist local authorities in disrupting and preventing their operation.

Previous ITSUM indicate that your AOR contains illegal mines. Further investigations and PIRs are in effect. FHQs has been notified to help alert the proper points of contact and offices for Child Protection / Human Rights.”

- The report concludes with a directive to develop COAs to address this illegal activity in your AOR and to deal with the problem of child labor and child soldiers.

- Your staff has learned that the nearest police station or host nation security force available in the AOR does not have the capabilities to assist.

Instructor Notes

- Depending on national caveats and rules for detainee operations, this is likely to be a very contentious discussion. The point of this exercise, however, is to force the participants to think through how detainee operations might work. Instructors may need to alter the situation above in order to create the right scenario for participants to address the training objectives.
- Lesson material for detainee operations can be found in STM Module 3.9.
- Some questions that can guide the instruction:
 - o Which are the UN agencies should you coordinate with when it comes to detainee operations?
 - o How do you liaise with local authorities?
 - o What are the items to be searched?
 - o What are the points to be kept in mind while searching a female detainee?
 - o What are options to assist the unit in providing food and water to detainees?
 - o What is a detainee kit? What should be in it?
 - o What should be available in a temporary detainee holding area?
 - o How might you task organize a UNIBAT COY to for establishing a temporary detainee holding area?
 - o What should be the security arrangement of holding area?

TTX Learning Activity #4

- You receive reporting that the PRM desire to disrupt aid deliveries to Cambo areas and that (in a new development) they are willing to attack UN forces that are securing these convoys.
- You receive a report that an IED detonates near a WFP convoy near Karaoy. There are no injuries or damage to property, but this is a new development in your AOR that indicates a growing threat.
- The next day a company patrol identifies a suspected device emplaced on the MSR between Pyatiletka and Burundai.
- A local reliable source informs the Mokavianian National Police that there is an IED maker in your AOR, but he does not have further information. The MNP discover some suspicious components in a house in the Payat enclave north of Burundai. The police have no bomb squad, and they request your assistance in protecting the population and security forces against IED attacks, as well as searching suspected devices or residences.
- You report these developments to Sector HQs, and the Sector Commander authorises you to assist and tells you to develop a plan to integrate additional assets and develop COAs to address this growing threat.
- What tactical planning considerations should you consider in incorporating these assets? What assets do you need? What actions should you take to mitigate risks to the population and UN forces?

Instructor Notes

- Remind the participants to review lesson 3.7. You may have to remind them that they are not expected to be experts in EOD, but they should focus on the tactical considerations for incorporating new assets and how to employ them. They should also look to the FP measures for the rest of their force. How should they work with host nation security forces?
- The following questions may be useful as the group considers plans of how to react to IED incident:
 - Consider the military force assets which are available and other non-organic assets are required. The battalions EP team, EOD IEDD assets, for sure, but what about engineers search teams, additional UN POL and military police, Explosive detection dogs?
 - Engaging local population leadership to direct population away from blast areas
 - Ariel Photos of the Compound & the Area and other ISR / MPKI products
 - Assets from Sector / FHQs to support civilian engagement and Liaison
 - A Warning Order to the relevant elements of the Battalion should be sent by Battalion HQ
 - Establishing an Incident Control Point
 - C2 established, EOD personnel briefed and part of the orders process
 - Cordon established both outer and inner
 - Organize for Search of Compound
 - Briefing to all troops to emphasize the IED threat is present. Units will be expected to conduct 5s when occupying cordon positions
 - 5 c's should be reminded to all personnel
 - Actions on an IED being found should be considered-IED found during Search, IED found on cordon, and IED exploding
 - Based on the maps provided the operation will take place on across the river away from the UN Camp and local Hospital. What is the medivac plan? Does it account for protests?
 - Has fire service support requested?
- Some of the answers will not be clear-cut, demonstrating the challenge